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Causality implies formal state collapse
George Svetlichny∗
Abstract
A physical theory of experiments carried out in a space-time re-
gion can accommodate a detector localized in another space-like sep-
arated region, in three, not necessarily exclusive, ways: 1) the detec-
tor formally collapses physical states across space-like separations, 2)
the detector enables superluminal signals, and 3) the theory becomes
logically inconsistent. If such a theory admits autonomous evolving
states, the space-like collapse must be instantaneous. Time-like sep-
aration does not allow such conclusions. We also prove some simple
results on structural stability: within the set of all possible theories,
under a weak empirical topology, the set of all theories with super-
luminal signals and the set of all theories with retrograde signals are
both open and dense.
1 Introduction
It has been said that quantum mechanics exhibits “spooky action-at-a-distance”
through state “collapse” across a space-like separation. We show that col-
lapse (whether considered spooky or not) is a formal feature of any complete,
correct, and causal physical theory which incorporates current experimental
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practices. Thus said collapse is not a feature of quantum mechanics as such.
This offers an interesting twist on the usual discussions in the case of stan-
dard quantum theory. Space-like quantum state collapse, to the extent that
it is not interpreted as a change of epistemic probabilities, has always been
considered a mysterious affair. It suggested to many people the existence
of an action-at-a-distance and even that it could somehow be harnessed to
carry superluminal signals. There have even been concrete proposals of su-
perluminal communication devices based on this hope. From our perspective
one can read the situation in a completely reverse fashion: that space-like
quantum state-collapse has been empirically borne out by correlation exper-
iments is not a suggestion that superluminal signals may be possible, but,
being a necessary condition of their absence, is a suggestion of their impossi-
bility. To our knowledge only Ryff and Monken(1) have come near this point
in showing that lack of collapse in certain “interaction-free” measurements
would lead to superluminal signals. The formal aspects of collapse in the
case of quantum mechanics have also been addressed by Macdonald(2).
We argue our point by considering a theory that is already successful in
describing phenomena in a certain space-time region and see how it must
accommodate a detector acting in another region. We have already used the
artifice of a distant detector(3) to show that under some of the usual assump-
tions about quantum mechanical states, particularly the collapse hypothesis,
part of the linear structure of quantum mechanics follows from the impossi-
bility of superluminal signals. We see here to what extent we can relax the
assumptions of the cited article and still draw significant conclusions.
Classical theories fall under our province and so have the same feature, but
since up to now any collapse was always viewed incontestably as readjustment
of the knowledge we have of the system, it was never seen as “spooky” and
generally not deemed a significant point to be discussed.
Standard quantum theory, which should be used as a reference, is highly
successful and highly accurate. If it is to be superseded by a new theory,
this one must make numerical predictions that are very close to those for
which the standard theory has been upheld in the laboratory, and so, in a
certain sense, must be very close to quantum theory. Our result thus does
say something significant about our future views of physics.
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By a causal theory we mean one without superluminal communication
and without retrograde signals (signals to the causal past). Specifically we
disallow correlations in measurement results in different regions of space-time
to result in the unwanted signals. We say that collapse is a formal feature to
mean that the formalism must necessarily allow for such a description. If the
actual discourse of physicists using the theory would contain such language,
and if so, consider collapse a physical process, is a matter up to interpretation,
taste, social practice, and metaphysics. Seeing as how twentieth century
physicists have generally created their ontology directly from the formalism,
such language would be probable, assuming no radical shift of world view.
Our discussion is mostly metatheoretic, that is, concerned with the math-
ematical and logical structure of physical theories. Mathematically the re-
sults are trivial, based on a reading of what formally is the conditional prob-
ability formula. Part of the argument is methodological as appeals are made
as what is currently accepted experimental practice.
Since the possibility of superluminal and retrograde signals is such a pow-
erful metatheoretic device, it is desirable to know how prevalent these features
are. Formalizing in a fairly primitive, but empirically significant fashion, the
set of all possible theories, we point out that the subset of theories that have
superluminal signals, and the subset of theories that have retrograde signals
are both dense and open in the weak topology defined by a finite number of
empirical observations. If the absence of these features is part of Nature, any
future theory transcending standard quantum mechanics would be exceed-
ingly hard to construct. A striking exemplification of this last point are the
results that show that absence of superluminal signals implies much of the
linear structure of standard quantum mechanics(3, 4, 5) provided we main-
tain some of the usual quantum mechanical notions about physical states.
This fact is the main reason that no one has up to now presented a con-
sistent relativistic non-linear quantum mechanics (See however Svetlichny(6)
and Kent(7) for initial attempts in this direction). Another consequence of
the density of sets with these features is that any slight miscalculation in, or
misunderstanding of, a causal theory could convince a person that she or he
has stumbled upon a means of sending superluminal or retrograde signals.
While quantum mechanics is still the prevailing theory we should continue
to see more and more proposals to implement such signals using quantum
mechanical collapse.
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2 Empirical Statistical Theories
Physical theories, regardless of their conceptual and mathematical complex-
ity or their metaphysical outlook on the world, must in the end describe and
predict raw observational data. Different patterns in raw data would in prin-
ciple require different theories to accommodate them, and a metatheoretic
classification can be made on the basis of these patterns. Such a classifica-
tion, being to a large extent indifferent to the theories’ mathematical and
conceptual structures and to their metaphysical commitments, would have
the greatest possible generality.
Any physical theory that proposes to predict the probabilities of exper-
imental outcomes must at least admit preparation procedures that would
allow one to perform experiments repeatedly “under the same conditions”
and observation procedures that would allow one to claim that one is “per-
forming the same experiment” under these conditions. Any realizable exper-
iment can lead to only a finite number of results and so if E is an observation
procedure, we shall denote by {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn} its possible outcomes (“pointer
positions”). Given a preparation procedureW and an observation procedure
E , the relative frequencies of outcome ǫj in a long run is normally taken to
approximate the probability P (W, E , ǫj) of the result and which a scientific
theory endeavors to calculate. Now both preparation and observation proce-
dures are subject to some equivalence relations since it is generally accepted
that different physical acts can prepare the “same state of affairs” and dif-
ferent apparatus can effect the “same measurements” on the said state of
affairs. Without going into any specific analysis, such equivalence relations,
which we denote by ∼, must at least be statistically consistent, that is
W ∼W ′ ⇒ ∀E , P (W, E , ǫj) = P (W
′, E , ǫj) (1)
E ∼ E ′ ⇒ ∃ a permutation π of {1, . . . , n} such that
∀W, P (W, E , ǫj) = P (W, E
′, ǫ′π(j)). (2)
Now the right-hand of the implications (1) and (2) in themselves define equiv-
alence relations that though implied by the one already postulated can be
different. We call this possibly larger relation, statistical equivalence and de-
note it by ≈. The equivalence classes under ∼ are generally part of what is
formalized in a particular theory. In practice one usually says that the prepa-
ration procedure creates a “physical state” which is subsequently “measured”
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by the observation procedure. Thus the equivalence classes of preparation
procedures are often referred to as “states” and those of observation proce-
dures as “observables”. Such language is in accord with the current physical
intuition but is not at all necessary and we avoid it in general so as not to
arouse ingrained semantic habits.
There must also be some sort of relativity theory that allows us to iden-
tify equivalent experiments performed in separate regions of space-time, and
likewise some sort of causality hypothesis to allow independently performed
experiments. This is necessary to gather statistics on a “run” of experiments.
We point out that while ≈ is a purely empirical relation, ∼ is a metaphys-
ical concern. In quantum mechanics all three of the following prescriptions
for creating a photon are ≈ equivalent: preparation W1 is to pass light from
an incandescent source through a prism to pick out a given frequency; prepa-
rationW2 is to pass light of the same frequency as in preparationW1 (created
in any way whatsoever) through a linear polarizer which is subject to ran-
dom rotations from a horizontal to a vertical orientation; preparation W3 is
to create a two-photon singlet state twice the energy of W1 and take one of
the emerging photons as the prepared state. Now W1 ≈ W2 ≈ W3 and each,
for computational purposes, is described by a 2× 2 density matrix 1
2
I. Now
whereasW1 ∼ W2 is likely to be maintained by most physicists, though some
might contest it, there is some considerable disagreement about W1 ∼ W3
(and W2 ∼ W3). Some would say that W3 is not really a one-photon state
but a two-photon state in which one is merely doing a limited kind of mea-
surement (only looking at one, which is “unpolarized”). Others, however, feel
that a beam of “unpolarized photons” is ontologically the same as a beam of
photon of equally distributed random polarizations.
Part of the notion of preparation and observation procedures is that the
observation procedure is not to be considered as part of the preparation
procedure. Thus the usual causal understanding is that the preparation is
not influenced by any observation, for otherwise it would not be possible to
talk about well defined states of affairs that one observes, nor of controlled
experiments in general.
Now one need not execute the observation procedure only in the instances
that the preparation procedure is deemed successful. What does take place in
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practice is that one performs a long experimental run and only a posteriori
analyzes those instances in which the preparation was deemed successful.
This is most apparent for instance in high-energy physics. A simple model
for what happens in practice would be to consider that there is some “gross”
preparation procedure W0 and two observation procedures D with outcomes
{δ1, . . . , δp}, and E with outcomes {ǫ1, . . . , ǫn}. A long experimental run is
executed and only the cases in which δ1 is realized are considered to be the
cases in which the desired state of affairs has been created and for which the
observations corresponding to E are then subsequently analyzed. Data for
which some other outcome δi, i 6= 1 obtains, is simply ignored. This is what
is done for instance in coincidence experiments. The procedure described
above can be called an indirect preparation procedure. The normal attitude
concerning it is that the compound procedure: “execute W0 then execute D
and consider the operation successful if δ1 obtains”, is just as legitimate a
procedure for creating a state of affairs as any other. One still executes E
and collects data even if δ1 did not occur merely for technological reasons, it
would just be too difficult or impossible to set up the experiment in another
way. Since by assumption the separate executions of the experiment in the
long run do not interfere with each other, the fact that the instances of the
desired state of affairs are imbedded in a larger set along with states of affairs
of no interest is innocuous as mere data analysis weeds them out.
Observation procedures E and D may pertain to separate space-time re-
gions which can be arbitrarily related to each other. If D is time-like past
to E then one has the usual pre-conditioning in which all of the preparation
acts occur time-like prior to the observation acts. This is in accord with the
usual causal notions. For space-like separation though, which acts are prior
and which are subsequent, depends on the reference frame. This is accepted
procedure and space-like conditioning is common in coincidence experiments.
One could even allow post-conditioning , that is conditioning a state to a fu-
ture time-like measurement. Such practice, though perfectly legitimate, is
not usually considered. The bias against post-conditioning stems basically
from conventional views concerning causality. Thus one does not generally
admit that future time-like events condition present ones in some, admittedly
ill-formulated, physical sense, and so while the mathematical and procedural
status of post-conditioning is quite legitimate and uncontestable, one gener-
ally feels that for future time-like situations it has no physical basis and so
any data analysis performed in this matter is totally superfluous and would
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not lead to any new physical insights. Summing up one can say that current
experimental practices allow indirect preparation procedures, for both past-
time-like pre-conditioning and space-like conditioning (either pre- or post-),
but do not allow future-time-like post-conditioning.
Now the theory presumably has a certain mathematical formalization and
predictive power based on a logical deductive system. In particular it should
have formalized the ∼ equivalence classes [W] and [E ] of preparation and
observation procedures and predict the values of the observed probabilities
P (W, E , ǫj) via statements of the form P (W, E , ǫj) = Q([W], [E ], ej). Here
ej is the mathematical object that corresponds to the outcome ǫj . It also in
principle predicts some “laws of nature” which would be true predicates con-
cerning the predicted probabilities Q([W], [E ], ej). We say a theory is correct
if all predicted predicates (theorems) are in fact true on empirical facts and
we say a theory is complete if every predicate true on empirical facts is in fact
predicted (is a theorem) of the theory. If a theory is incomplete, expanding
its axiomatic basis by the empirical facts that are not instances of theorems
would turn it complete unless this procedure turned the theory incorrect
(some new theorems are now in fact false). In this later case the theory
certainly must be abandoned. We call a theory successful if it is correct and
complete. Merely adding some facts to the axiom basis is phenomenology of
the crudest sort, but is a necessary step to assure the overall consistency of
the theory. We use the terms “correct” and “complete” in the purely logical
sense of an interpreted deductive theory, not to be confused with other usage
found in the physical literature.
Given a preparation procedure W, then for any observation procedure E
one has that
∑
i P (W, E , ǫi) = 1. Let w be a map which to any E and to
any result ǫi of E assigns a non-negative real numbers w
E(ǫi). We say w is a
weight if
∑
i w
E(ǫi) is independent of E , and we say the weight is normalized
if this sum is one. Preparation procedures determine normalized weights
through wEW(ǫi) = P (W, E , ǫi). We call such weights physical . Obviously a
physical weight satisfies E ∼ E ′ ⇒ wEW(ǫi) = w
E ′
W(π(ǫi)), and W ∼ W
′ ⇒
wEW(ǫi) = w
E
W ′(ǫi).
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3 Space-Time Extensions
Suppose now that we have a theory T in which the observation procedures
all pertain to some bounded region of space-time O. We assume this is a
successful theory, that is, it is correct and complete. In contrast to the ob-
servation procedures, do not assume that the preparation procedures pertain
to O, or for that matter to any specific space-time region. For instance, one
may be observing some global cosmological structure. Suppose now we have
another space-time region O′ and that pertaining to this region is an observa-
tion procedure consisting of a detector D with possible outcomes {δ1, . . . , δp}.
We assume that we can run the detector in conjunction with any observation
procedure E in O. This, under normal causality assumptions, would always
be the case if the two regions are space-like separated, but here we take it
as a hypothesis and do not a-priori assume any space-time relations between
O and O′. We shall denote by O 9 O′ the assumption that no signals
can be sent from O to O′ utilizing measurements in both regions and some
preparation procedure.
As far as the user of theory T is concerned, when he confronts the task
of incorporating detector D, he is faced with “new phenomena” (“states”
created by conditioning to outcomes of D), “new instruments” (concurrent
measurements of E and D), and a “greater world” O ∪O′.
The possible results of such a new compound experiment would be set
of pairs (ǫi, δj). We now ask what possible theories can there be of such
compound procedures and what relation can these have to the original theory
T .
Let Tˆ be any extension of T incorporating the detector D and let Pˆ be
the probability function for Tˆ , that is Pˆ (W, E ,D, ǫi, δj) is the joint probabil-
ity of getting result (ǫi, δj) using preparation procedure W and observation
procedure (E ,D). Our first result is:
O′ 9 O ⇒
∑
j
Pˆ (W, E ,D, ǫi, δj) = P (W, E , ǫi) (3)
for otherwise one can, by choosing to run the detector D or not, send a signal
from region O′ to region O. Thus O′ 9 O implies that the O-marginal
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theory of Tˆ in which one sums over the results of D has to coincide with
T . Now one in principle also has an O′-marginal theory T ′, though we
have not postulated one. One can always formally consider it as a purely
phenomenological one consisting of the same preparation procedures as T ,
one observation procedure D, the set of empirical facts given by probabilities
P ′(W,D, δj) of having outcome δj in the absence of any observation in O
and a trivial deductive system having no deduction rules. From the point
of view of the user of T such a theory in itself is of no use as his task is
to incorporate the new reality into T itself. With this in mind we rewrite
(3) for the reverse situation O 9 O′ in a way that does not mention the
O′-marginal theory. This is our second result:
O 9 O′ ⇒ ∃ c1 . . .∃ cp ∀ E
∑
i
Pˆ (W, E ,D, ǫi, δj) = cj (4)
This holds since otherwise by changing to a different observation procedure
E ′ one could send a signal from O to O′. Here cj is the putative probability
P ′(W,D, δj).
We note that if (3) holds, then T can be maintained under ignorance of
the results of D. Regardless of (3) holding or not, theory Tˆ must meet various
challenges under knowledge of the result of D. Thus ∼ may no longer hold
statistically. It may happen that there are preparation procedures W ∼ W ′
for which there is an E such that Pˆ (W,D, E , ǫi, δj) 6= Pˆ (W
′, E ,D, ǫi, δj). Now
∼ is a metaphysical equivalence, so a change of world view would allow one
to pass to more fine-grained equivalence classes and recover statistical equiv-
alence. Formally one may simply partition by the new ≈, each equivalence
class [W] in which the previous statistical equivalence is broken. It can also
happen that there are observation procedures E ∼ E ′ for which there is a
W such that Pˆ (W, E ,D, ǫi, δj) 6= Pˆ (W, E
′,D, ǫπ(i), δj). In general one can
always perform the same trick of passing to finer-grained equivalence classes
by partitioning any equivalence class [E ] which requires it, and adjusting our
metaphysics to accompany this change. When (4) holds, there is however
another way to view the situation. Assuming that cj 6= 0 then the map
(E , ǫi) 7→ w
E
(W ,j)(i) = c
−1
j Pˆ (W, E ,D, ǫi, δj) (5)
is a normalized weight in T which respects the new ∼ for preparation proce-
dures and therefore has all the trappings of a physical weight. It is therefore
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either a physical weight, or one can incorporate “conditioned to outcome δj”
as a legitimate new instruction in preparation procedures enlarging thus the
“state space” of T .
This makes perfect sense for various reasons. The first is that cj is inde-
pendent of E and so one can indeed interpret indirect preparation procedure
as a legitimate preparation for something to be measured since this very
notion incorporates the idea of independence of preparation from the mea-
surement. Secondly the number cj is the putative probability that result δj
obtains in D so division by this number in (5) can be simply seen as nor-
malizing the number of occurrences of ǫi to the number of times that δj has
occurred as in usual conditional probabilities. Thus formally one has
wE(W ,j)(i) = w
E
W|j(i) (6)
where W|j is the indirect preparation procedure alluded to. The “state
space” is now enlarged to include the W|j. This can now be viewed as a
“conditioned state” and the theory can be said to have formal state condi-
tioning , which we abbreviate it SC.
As far as the deductive system of T is concerned, under O 9 O′ we
can enlarge the set of equivalence classes of preparation and observation
procedures, and also enlarge the set of true empirical facts which we add to
the axiomatic basis. If the new resulting theory is successful we say we have
correctness stability which we abbreviate to CS.
The resulting successful theory now has formal state conditioning, and
have thus proved that under O 9 O′ one has
CS ⇒ SC (7)
If wW is the physical weight corresponding toW then the map wW 7→ w(W ,j)
where w(W ,j) is defined by (5) can be considered as indicative of a “state
collapse” [W] 7→ [W|j] in analogy with the collapse hypothesis of standard
quantum theory. Thus a form of state collapse is a consequence of O 9 O′
and CS.
Given the generality of our exposition, [W|j] = [W] is a logical possibility.
Though we may not want to consider “no collapse” as “collapse”, we cannot
in general rule out that probabilities will not change under conditioning.
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Since any viable theory must necessarily be empirically close to quantum
mechanics, change of probabilities must be as prevalent in it as in quantum
mechanics, so “collapse” as a generic description is justifiable.
4 Space-Like Separation
Here we assume O and O′ are space like separated. Under usual causality
assumptions O 9 O′ and O′ 9 O both hold. This precludes superluminal
signals (SS) by use of the measurement process. Under ¬SS we have the
conclusions of both (3) and (4). Thus the space-like variant of (7) is:
¬SS and CS ⇒ SC. (8)
Which can also be written as the disjunct:
SC or SS or ¬CS. (9)
A rough paraphrase of this would be that theory Tˆ either admits formal
space-like state conditioning or else there are superluminal signals or else it
is wrong. Note that this is true for the space-like extension of any theory
whatsoever and so is a complete classification.
Of course one does not in practice develop a theory for one space-time
region O only to then try to extend it to include other regions. One gen-
erally proposes some universal theory U of which both T and Tˆ are to be
restrictions. This means that any such proposal can be examined in the light
of (9) which now refers to U . Since presumably U is a successful theory we
are then left with the disjunction SS or SC. Paraphrasing:
Any successful physical theory either allows superluminal signals or is
formally a space-like state-collapse theory. In particular, a successful causal
theory necessarily exhibits formal space-like state collapse.
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5 TheoriesWith Autonomous Evolving States
We now reexamine the above results for theories that admit the notion of
autonomous evolving state. Given a preparation procedure W one assumes
that at some instant tW the procedure has run its course and has created
a physical entity σW(tW) usually called an instantaneous physical state and
which from then on behaves autonomously without reliance on the procedure
that gave it birth. One has the notion of evolution in that for t > tW one has
the state σW(t) which can be prepared by the following prescription: execute
W and wait t− tW units of time. We shall consider the evolution to be deter-
ministic in that given σW(tW), then σW(t) is uniquely determined. For such a
conception to be applicable to an observation procedure E , this too must have
associated to it a time instant tE at which the apparatus “engages” the state
and then it is a postulate of such theories that the probabilities of outcomes
depend only on the instantaneous physical state at instant tE . Obviously if
W ∼ W ′, then by the meaning of ∼ one should have for t > max(tW , tW ′)
that σW(t) = σW ′(t). The probability functional P (W, E , ǫi) can now be
expressed entirely in terms of the instantaneous state P (σ(tE), E , ǫi) and one
often conventionally drops all reference to preparation procedures and only
deals with evolving autonomous physical states σ(t).
We must emphasize that in these type of theories the states are con-
sidered as instantaneous . That is, the state description σ(t) for t ≥ tW
describes the state at that instant and refers to its entire supposed spatial
extent, which may be the full simultaneity hyperplane in the frame of the ob-
server. This is manifestly a frame dependent description and of course raises
the well know issues of compatibility with relativistic covariance. As with
relativistic quantum mechanics, we must assume that divergence of state de-
scriptions maintained by observers in different reference frames does not lead
to divergence of predicted experimental probabilities. We shall assume this
requirement is met in a successful theory.
Let us now examine a theory with instantaneous physical states T per-
taining to a space-time region O and again as in section 3 assume we have
a detector in a space-like separated region O′ and that the extended theory
Tˆ is also one with instantaneous physical states. To analyze what ¬SS says
in this case consider then a situation in which the detector D engages the
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instantaneous state σ(t) at some instant and that the detector outcome is
realized at an instant tD before the apparatus of the observation procedure
E engages it at instant tE . By the premises of instantaneous state theo-
ries, conditioning to outcome δj of D must now define a new instantaneous
state which comes into existence at an instant tδj with tD ≤ tδj ≤ tE . To
conclude anything further one must invoke more hypotheses. Under con-
ventional causality hypotheses, the space-like separated apparatus used in E
cannot have any influence on what the description at D is and since one can
run an appropriate such apparatus in such a way that tE is arbitrarily close to
tD, one must conclude that tδj = tD. In other words, absence of superluminal
signals implies that σ(t) undergoes an instantaneous “collapse” at tD to a
new instantaneous state σj(tD) depending on the outcome δj of the detector.
Summarizing:
Any successful causal theory describing autonomous evolving states, for-
mally exhibits instantaneous space-like state-collapse.
As applied to quantum mechanics, instantaneous state-collapse is at times
interpreted as “preparation-at-a-distance”, that is manipulation of objective
reality at a space-like separated location. Our result is a formal consequence
of causality (to some extent contrary to such an interpretation) and must
not be taken as implying any sort of action-at-a-distance.
6 Time-Like Separation
There are two cases of time-like separation to consider, when O′ is time-like
past to O, and when it is time-like future. In both cases, assuming the actual
physical possibility of carrying out experiments E and D, one can carry over
some of the arguments in section 3. The difference stems from the fact that
while signals from the future to the past may be deemed pernicious those
from the past to the future are not bothersome and are in fact welcome as
pyramids, filing systems, and memories attest.
In the first case, if one precludes retrograde signals, one has (4) and we
can carry over the arguments of 3 that follow that equation to conclude
formal state collapse in successful causal theories in which the conditioning
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measurement D is time-like past to the observation procedure E . This of
course is the usual familiar situation. In the second case we can no longer
claim the conclusion of (4). So the sum in (4) can now depend on E making
it impossible to consider the resulting state of affairs as being the result of a
conditioning of the initial one by D, independently of what E measurement
one makes on it, precluding a state collapse interpretation. The state of af-
fairs is somehow mutually co-conditioned by both D and E and in general
by any other measurement performed “in between”, that is in a region O′′
which is time-like future to O and time-like past to O′. It escapes the usual
paradigm of an experiment consisting of preparation and observation. With-
out any compelling argument that it offers new physical insights it can be
generally ignored.
This situation occurs in fact in standard quantum mechanics. Assume one
has initially prepared a Heisenberg quantum state described by a density ma-
trix ρ0 which is then subject to two successive measurements corresponding to
self adjoint operators A andB each with discrete spectrum and corresponding
finite spectral decomposition A =
∑
i λiPi and B =
∑
j µjQj . According to
the usual projection rule the joint probability of seeing outcomes (i, j) for the
two measurements is P (i, j) = Tr(QjPiρ0PiQj) = Tr(Piρ0PiQj) from which
we derive the conditional probabilities P (j|i) and P (i|j). The first one is the
pre-conditioned probability which is Tr(Qjρi) where ρi = Piρ0Pi/Tr(Piρ0) is
a new density matrix. Thus the state of affairs created by pre-conditioning
is again expressible by a density matrix which depends only on ρ0 and the
projector Pi and so in particular is independent of B, i.e. “observation” does
not interfere with “preparation”. The second, post-conditioned, probability,
P (i|j) = Tr(Piρ0PiQj)/
∑
k Tr(Pkρ0PkQj) is quite different in general when-
ever A and B do not commute. One cannot write P (i|j) as Tr(Piρj) for any
density matrix ρj determined solely by ρ0 and the spectral projectors of B, as
P (i|j) in general also depends on the other compatible projectors Pk, k 6= i
that are measured along with Pi.
Given the above, it is not clear whether there is any advantage in intro-
ducing post conditioned “states of affairs” among what we consider to be
our physical states and incorporate them into our theory. However, the case
for this in quantum mechanics was argued by Aharonov and collaborators(8)
who seem to claim that such new ensembles teach us something fundamental.
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7 Structural Stability
Because any future fundamental theory must, on the level of raw experimen-
tal facts, be neighboring to standard quantum theory, one is naturally led to
investigate the neighborhoods of standard quantum theory in the set of all
theories, provided these notions can be appropriately formalized. We make
a preliminary step in this direction and find that the set of theories with
superluminal communication and the set of theories with retrograde signals
are both dense open sets. This means that in any neighborhood of standard
quantum mechanics there are radically different theories, and any modifica-
tion of quantum mechanics, no matter how small, can, if extreme care is not
taken, produce theories with superluminal and retrograde signals.
As before, consider a theory with some preparation procedures W and
some observation procedures E with outcomes (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn). The physical con-
tent of the theory is contained in the sets of numbers P (W, E , ǫj). The space
of all possible theories that describe a certain fixed set of procedures for
preparation and observations is the set of all possible such assignments. Since
within the lifetime of any civilization, only a finite number of experiments
can be performed, and each empirical probability can only be ascertained to
a limited degree of accuracy, a statement of the empirical closeness of two
theories P and Q would be of the form
|P (W, E , ǫj)−Q(W, E , ǫj)| < ǫ (10)
where ǫ > 0 and W and E run over some finite sets W and E respectively.
For fixed P , W , E, and ǫ the set of Q that satisfies the above inequality
is a neighborhood of P in a topology that we call weak . Consider now a
theory that can describe events in regionsO and O′, and consider observation
procedures with outcome sets (our generic ǫ’s) being sets of pairs (αi, δj); i =
1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m where αi refers to outcomes observed in O and δj to
outcomes observed in O′. Now for O 9 O′ to hold, it is necessary that
∑
i
P (W, E , (αi, δj)) =
∑
ℓ
P (W, E˜ , (βℓ, δ˜k)) (11)
for all E˜ that coincide in their procedure with E in region O′ and where δj and
δ˜k correspond the same physically determined outcome in region O
′ for the
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two procedures. Intuitively speaking, this condition is a set of equalities, and
equalities are easily broken by arbitrarily small perturbations, whereas strict
inequalities are maintained for sufficiently small perturbations. One would
thus expect that the set where a strict inequality holds to be dense and
open. In terms of the assignments above, the only a-priori constraint is that
P (W, E , ǫj) ≥ 0 and
∑
j P (W, E , ǫj) = 1 which defines for each pair (W, E)
a simplex ∆(W ,E). So the set of all theories is the product T =
∏
(W ,E)∆(W ,E)
and it’s clear that the weak topology is just the product topology of the
usual topologies in the simplices. An equality (11) is held on a proper linear
subvariety of the product ∆(W ,E) × ∆(W ,E˜) and so in T this defines a dense
open set. Since the union of dense open sets is dense and open, any set of
such equalities defines a set of theories whose compliment is dense and open.
Under the empirical notion of closeness, the set of theories with super-
luminal signals and the set of theories with retrograde signals are both open
and dense.
Of course T above is a very primitive description of the set of all the-
ories. It doesn’t for instance take into account the ∼ equivalence relation,
but to do so one simply goes over to the product over equivalence classes∏
([W ],[E])∆(W ,E) and precisely the same considerations apply. The conclusion
may fail to hold if one imposed some further a-priori relation on the prob-
ability assignments or considered stronger topologies but to motivate these
would require completely new metatheoretic and philosophic considerations.
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